The US can still fight and win two big wars at the same time, or at least come close to doing so, and neither Russia nor China would consider the bet as a risk worth taking. The United States is able to do so because it continues to have the world’s most formidable military and because it leads a military alliance that is tremendously powerful.
Late last decade, the US abandoned its oft-misunderstood “two war” policy, which was meant as a pattern for providing the capability to fight two regional wars at the same time. Originally intended to discourage North Korea from initiating a conflict when the US was fighting Iran or Iraq (or vice versa), the concept helped shape the Pentagon’s procurement, logistical, and basing plans in the post–Cold War era, when the US no longer needed to deal with the Soviet threat. Because of changes in the international order, such as China’s rising influence and the emergence of extremely effective terrorist networks, the US withdrew from the theory.
What if, instead of fighting governments like North Korea and Iran, the US had to fight two wars today? What if China and Russia were to coordinate well enough to launch simultaneous military operations in the Pacific and Europe?
Political Coordination
Could Beijing and Moscow plan a pair of crises that would necessitate two distinct military responses from the US? Maybe, but most likely not. Each country has its own objectives and schedule for achieving them. More than likely, one of the two would seize the opportunity to bolster its regional claims by exploiting an existing crisis. If the United States were embroiled in a big skirmish in the South China Sea, Moscow would possibly opt to push the Baltic States.
In either case, the war would begin on Moscow’s or Beijing’s initiative. In all sectors, the United States profits from the status quo, and it prefers to achieve its political goals through diplomatic and economic means (at least when it comes to big countries). While the US may set the stage for conflict, Russia or China would be the ones to fire the first shot.
Flexibility:
On the plus side, just a few of the fighting criteria for Europe and the Pacific coincide. The US Army, as in World War II, would be responsible for protecting Europe, while the Navy would focus on the Pacific. In both theaters, the United States Air Force (USAF) would play a supporting role.
Russia lacks the capability to confront NATO in the North Atlantic and is unlikely to do so for political reasons. While the US and its NATO allies can devote some resources to threatening Russia’s maritime area (and providing insurance against a Russian naval sortie), the US Navy (USN) can focus its forces on the Pacific. Depending on the length of the conflict and the level of notice given, the US Army could send significant assets to Europe to assist with any substantial fighting.
The majority of American carriers, submarines, and surface ships would be stationed in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, directly opposing China’s A2/AD system and straddling China’s maritime transit routes. Long-range aircraft, such as stealth bombers and other such capabilities, would be deployed in both theaters as needed.
The military of the United States would be under intense pressure to achieve conclusive victory in at least one theater as soon as feasible. This might lead the US to focus its air, space, and cyber capabilities in one direction in the hopes of achieving a strategic and political win that would allow the rest of its weight to transfer to the other theater. Given the strength of the US allies in Europe, the US may choose to concentrate on the conflict at first.
Parting Shots:
The US can still fight and win two big wars at the same time, or at least come close to doing so, and neither Russia nor China would consider the bet as a risk worth taking. The United States is able to do so because it continues to have the world’s most formidable military and because it leads a military alliance that is tremendously powerful. Furthermore, Russia and China provide quite distinct military challenges, allowing the US to commit some assets to one and the remainder to the other.
However, it is important to note that this condition will not persist indefinitely. The United States will not be able to maintain its current level of dominance permanently, and will have to pick and choose its commitments carefully in the long run. At the same time, the US has established an international order that benefits many of the world’s most strong and rich nations; it can count on their support for the time being.